Abstract:
This paper builds on the earlier development of WAS a method of dealing with water issues that focuses on water values rather than water quantities and takes into account public values that are not simply private ones (see Fisher et al., 2005). WAS can be used for infrastructure or policy planning, but it can also assist in the resolution of water disputes. Indeed, WAS-guided cooperation in water can turn what appears to be a zero-sum gain into a win-win situation. It is shown that if WAS sets the rules for cooperation, then, when all claimants use those rules, the coalition of all of them together is stable. Results for possible coalitions of Israel, Jordan, and Palestine are given for varying assumptions as to water ownership. The gains from cooperation are compared and analyzed. WAS-guided cooperation is seen to make the value of ownership shifts relatively trivial.
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