A framed field experiment on collective enforcement mechanisms with Ethiopian farmers

Anke Reichhuber, Eva Camacho Cuena () and Till Requate

Environment and Development Economics, 2009, vol. 14, issue 05, pages 641-663

Abstract: We present the results of a framed field experiment with Ethiopian farmers that use the mountain rain forest as a common pool resource. Harvesting honey causes damage to the forest, and open access leads to over-harvesting. We test different mechanisms for mitigating excessive harvesting: a collective tax with low and high tax rates, and a tax/subsidy system. We find that the high-tax scheme works best in inducing the desired level of harvesting, while the tax-subsidy scheme may trigger tacit collusion. Via a panel data analysis we further investigate which variables influence the subjects' decisions during the treatments.

Date: 2009

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Working Paper: A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:endeec:v:14:y:2009:i:05:p:641-663_00

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