Measurement and sources of technical efficiency of land tenure contracts in Ethiopia

Mohamed M. Ahmed, Berhanu Gebremedhin, Samuel Ekow Benin and Simeon Ehui

Environment and Development Economics, 2002, vol. 7, issue 03, pages 507-527

Abstract: The degree to which prevailing land tenure arrangements constrain agricultural productivity, and the sources of inefficiency associated with land tenure systems in sub-Saharan Africa are unresolved. Using a stochastic frontier production function, this paper examines the economic efficiency and the determinants of inefficiency of alternative land tenure arrangements in Ethiopia. The results show that sharecropping and borrowing are less technically efficient than owner-cultivation or fixed rentals due to restrictions imposed on them by landowners and the interactions of the land market with other imperfect and absent input markets. Thus, a policy to facilitate more efficient transactions of land between farmers and functioning of input markets are expected to reduce inefficiencies associated with these tenure systems.

Date: 2002
View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1355770X0200030X link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:endeec:v:7:y:2002:i:03:p:507-527_00

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Environment and Development Economics from Cambridge University Press
Address: The Edinburgh Building, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 2RU UK
Series data maintained by Mike Eden ().