Labor Costs, Paternalism, and Loyalty in Southern Agriculture: A Constraint on the Growth of the Welfare State

Lee J. Alston and Joseph P. Ferrie

The Journal of Economic History, 1985, vol. 45, issue 01, pages 95-117

Abstract: We examine the role of southern legislators in resisting the early expansion of the welfare state in the 1930s. A desire to keep agricultural labor cheap and dependent on southern landlords motivated the resistance. Dependence promoted a loyal labor force and thereby reduced monitoring costs in the labor-intensive production of cotton. Federal and state welfare programs would have substituted for landlord paternalism and hence made labor less loyal. Evidence on the federal Old-Age and Unemployment Insurance systems and state Old-Age Pension and Mothers' Aid programs are found consistent with our hypothesis.

Date: 1985

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:jechis:v:45:y:1985:i:01:p:95-117_03

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