ENFORCING PROPERTY RIGHTS THROUGH REPUTATION: MEXICO'S EARLY INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1878 1913

Noel Maurer and Tridib Sharma ()

The Journal of Economic History, 2001, vol. 61, issue 04, pages 950-973

Abstract: Mexico s initial industrialization was based on firms that were grouped : that is, linked to other firms through close affiliations with a common bank. Most explanations for the prevalence of groups are based on increasing returns or missing formal capital markets. We propose a simpler explanation that better fits the facts of Mexican history. In the absence of secure property rights, tangible collateral could not credibly be offered to creditors; but there remained the possibility of using reputation as a form of intangible collateral. In such circumstances, firms had incentives to group together for purposes of mutual monitoring and insurance.

Date: 2001
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