Ideology, interest groups, and institutional change: the case of the British prohibition of wages in kind

Elaine Tan ()

Journal of Institutional Economics, 2005, vol. 1, issue 02, pages 175-191

Abstract: The new institutional economics has emphasized the importance of ideology in determining the content and direction of institutional change. Ideology can also determine when interest groups succeed in achieving legislative favor. The case of the regulation of in-kind wages in Britain shows that factors highlighted in mainstream political economy (such as interest group strength and organization, self-interest of legislators, and coalitional partners) were important. However, the interaction between relative price changes and social ideology was also significant in explaining the shape and timing of legislative changes. Changes in relative prices gave labor groups the incentive to seek legal protection from non-monetary wages, but they obtained protection only if they met certain criteria established by the prevailing ideology. Changes to that ideology resulted in further legislative changes granting cash wages to most industrial workers.

Date: 2005
View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1744137405000135 link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:jinsec:v:1:y:2005:i:02:p:175-191_00

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Institutional Economics from Cambridge University Press
Address: The Edinburgh Building, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 2RU UK
Series data maintained by Mike Eden ().