Abstract:
Many articles have attempted to define the raison d'être of banks in a context of financial disintermediation. Most of them have stressed the positive role of banks, due to their ability to produce and to transmit information about borrowers. This paper examines the validity of this consensus. The key issue is to identify the benefits but also the costs of bank debt. Three questions partially unresolved will be studied: Have the banks a special ability to manage the informational asymetries associated to credit relations ? Is the banking loan contract efficient in reducing the opportunism of banks ? How do borrowers choose among banks, trade creditors and the capital market ?
Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie is edited by Gérard Charreaux
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