La fonction R&D et la latitude managériale: une analyse théorique

Mehdi Nehkili and Evelyne Poincelot ()

Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2000, vol. 3, issue 1, pages 5-28

Abstract: The R&D function presents virtues well-known for their creation of value as well as a source of manipulation of the rent which ends up to be favourable to the leaders and prejudicial to some stakeholders. This proposition is particularly sustainable because in the firms which invest much in R&D, the traditional means used to control and give incentives to leaders are particularly reduced. Some empirical studies, with different aims, tend to demonstrate that investment in R&D field is an uncontrolled decision for the top management.

Keywords: R&D; managerial discretion; rent; stakeholders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000

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Working Paper: La fonction R&D et la latitude managériale:une analyse théorique (2000)
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