Le capitalisme familial, dans un contexte français, induit-il moins de dividendes que les autres formes d'actionnariat?

Monique Calvi-Reveyron ()
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Monique Calvi-Reveyron: Université de Savoie

Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2000, vol. 3, issue 1, pages 81-116

Abstract: This paper presents the results of an empirical study which had been realized on French quoted firms. This research aims at explaining the firm dividend level by insider equity and the dispersion of shareholders and relies on agency theory. The results show that insider equity is negatively related to the pay out ratio and that family firms have lower levels of dividends than managerial and controlled ones. But the dispersion of shareholders doesn't affect the pay out ratio.

Keywords: insider equity; dispersion of shareholders; agency theory; dividend level (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:3:y:2000:i:q1:p:81-116

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