Abstract:
The paper's purpose is to propose a typology of minority shareholders' activism in France. With the corporate governance theory, we study minority shareholders' activism. We identify their investment decisions, their abilities to collect and treat information and their power to control. The objective is to explain what kind of control they could exercise and what strategies they use. This activism is characterized by influence activities like lobbying, proxy contests and judicial actions. We suppose that contest process is a function of dissident coalition.
Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie is edited by Albert David
More articles in Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie from Editions Economica Address: 49,rue Héricart,75015 Paris, France Series data maintained by Gérard Charreaux ().
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