La renégociation des contrats d’externalisation:une analyse empirique

Jérôme Barthélemy ()
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Jérôme Barthélemy: Essec (Paris)

Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2006, vol. 9, issue 2, pages 5-29

Abstract: (VF)L’objectif de cet article est d’essayer de comprendre pourquoi certaines entreprises sont amenées à renégocier leurs contrats d’externalisation. Notre postulat de départ est que le nombre de renégociations augmente avec le temps écoulé depuis la signature du contrat. Nous montrons ensuite que cette relation est modérée par le caractère spécifique des actifs utilisés pour réaliser l’activité externalisée, l’incertitude qui l’entoure, son caractère stratégique ainsi que la difficulté de mesure de la performance. En revanche, la confiance ne semble pas avoir de rôle modérateur.(VA) The aim of this paper is to understand why some firms renegotiate their outsourcing contracts. The relationship between the age of the outsourcing contract and the number of renegotiations is straightforward. Older contracts are more likely to require adjustments simply because of the passage of time. On the other hand, the factors that may moderate this relationship have rarely been examined. This paper finds that the positive relationship between the age of outsourcing contracts and the number of renegotiations is moderated by asset specificity, environmental uncertainty, closeness to the « core business » and measurement difficulty. On the other hand, trust has no moderating impact.

Keywords: externalisation; contrat; renégociation; théorie des coûts de transaction; théorie de la ressource; outsourcing; contract; renegotiation; transaction cost economics; resource-based view of the firm. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L14 L24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)

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