Free Cash Flow, gouvernance et politique financière des entreprises françaises

Mehdi Nekhili (), Afifa Wali Siala and Dhikra Chebbi-Nehkili
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Afifa Wali Siala: Université de Sfax
Dhikra Chebbi-Nehkili: Université de Bourgogne

Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2009, vol. 12, issue 1, pages 5-31

Abstract: (VF)La limitation du problème du free cash flow dépend de l’efficacité des mécanismes de gouvernance.Sur la base d’un échantillon de 123 entreprises françaises en 2004, nous montrons que c’est la distribution soutenue des dividendes, et non le niveau d’endettement, qui permet de réduire le niveau du free cash flow. Les caractéristiques du conseil d’administration et de la structure de propriété agissent directement sur le niveau du free cash flow, plutôt qu’indirectement à travers la politique de distribution des dividendes.(VA)The limitation of free cash flow problems depends on the efficacy of the prevalent governance mechanisms. Investigating a sample of 123 French firms in 2004, we show that it is the sustained distribution of dividends – rather than leverage – that leads to a reduction of free cash flows. The specific characteristics of corporate boards and ownership structure are also shown to have a direct impact on free cash flow levels, rather than indirectly through dividend policy.

Keywords: Free cash flow; politique d’endettement; politique de distribution de dividende; conseil d'administration; structure de propriété; leverage; dividend policy; performance; ownership structure. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G32 G34 G35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:12:y:2009:i:q1:p:5-31.

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