Structures de propriété, pouvoir discrétionnaire managérial et choix d'activité dans l'assurance dommages en France

Fabrice Roth ()
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Fabrice Roth: Université Robert Schuman de Strasbourg

Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 1998, vol. 1, issue 1, pages 169-194

Abstract: Using the contractual theories framework, this article examines the relationship between the managerial discretion and the activity choices of the french property-liability insurance companies. We propose an effective positioning of the different ownership structures in regard to hazard moral and undiversifiable risks problems. Then we compare the size, the underwriting and the investment strategies on french data. Consistent with our expectations, the results of the tests indicate a specific positioning of the mutuals, stock ownership and state-owned forms.

Keywords: insurance; managerial discretion; contractual theories (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:1:y:1998:i:q1:p:169-194

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