Enracinement des dirigeants et richesse des actionnaires

Benoît Pigé ()
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Benoît Pigé: Université de Franche-Comté

Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 1998, vol. 1, issue 3, pages 131-158

Abstract: The CEO, as an agent, tries to be better entrenched, in order to reduce the risk of being dismissed. Our entrenchment model develops the importance for the CEO to get access to networks and to attain a higher performance. From a sample of 1 747 annual observations concerning 258 CEOs of public firms for the 1966-1990 period, empirical measures allow us to estimate the importance of internal networks and past performance by establishing a measure of CEO entrenchment. Furthermore, we observed, for the shareholders, the existence of an optimum of CEO entrenchment.

Keywords: entrenchment; CEO; performance; corporate governance. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:1:y:1998:i:q3:p:131-158

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