Abstract:
In industrial firms, rules to control investment are implemented. We study the capital budgeting of divisions and wholly-owned subsidiaries. We analyse the relationships between, on the one hand, the investment autonomy of divisional managers and wholly-owned subsidiaries' managers and, on the other hand, the characteris-tics of unit, firm and their own characteristics. We then consider the choice of the legal position of the unit (division or wholly-owned subsidiary) with respect to managerial control. We test our hypothesis on a sample of about 200 units which belong to 104 industrial firms.
Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie is edited by Albert David
More articles in Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie from Editions Economica Address: 49,rue Héricart,75015 Paris, France Series data maintained by Gérard Charreaux ().
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