Systèmes de contrainte, systèmes disciplinaires et décision face au risque. Le comportement du chargé d'affaires comme déterminant fondamental du risque de la banque

Lionel Honoré ()
Additional contact information
Lionel Honoré: Université de Nantes

Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 1998, vol. 1, issue 3, pages 85-106

Abstract: The banker is the middleman in the relationship between the bank and the firm. The understanding of the perception of the risk of the firm by the bank relies on an analysis of its strategy and governance structure. The classical and neoclassical approaches of behavioral risk reduce the individual choice to a search for rationalization and justification. Nonetheless some types of behaviors towards risk reveal a logic of responsabilization. To study them, we propose a socioeconomic approach of the governance system. The perception of this system by the banker regarding its own socioprofessional trajectory, determines his individual behavior towards risk.

Keywords: discipline; system of constraint; decision; risk taking; bank. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.u-bourgogne.fr/LEG/rev/013106.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:1:y:1998:i:q3:p:85-106

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Economica, 49,rue Héricart, 75015 Paris, France

Access Statistics for this article

Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie is edited by Albert David

More articles in Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie from Editions Economica
Address: 49,rue Héricart,75015 Paris, France
Series data maintained by Gérard Charreaux ().