Abstract:
The purpose of this study is to investigate two issues regarding the relation between stock option grants and firm performance. First, is the magnitude of stock option grants determined by firm performance ? Second, do stock option grants influence a firm's future performance ? Results indicate that firms with a good performance track record tend to grant more stock options to their executives. Furthermore, it appears that stock option grants influence owner-controlled firms' subsequent performance, but for only one subsequent year.
Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie is edited by Albert David
More articles in Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie from Editions Economica Address: 49,rue Héricart,75015 Paris, France Series data maintained by Gérard Charreaux ().
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