Abstract:
We study the bid-ask spreads observed in an experimental auction market. Three results are presented. First, the trading mechanism, which can destroy order books, should modify the measure of the spreads. Second, bid-ask spreads are reliable to the nature of the environment and to the type of information received by the traders. An adverse-selection mechanism should explain the volatility of the spread. Third, the behaviour of prices and volumes depends on an ambiguous situation on the market.
Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie is edited by Albert David
More articles in Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie from Editions Economica Address: 49,rue Héricart,75015 Paris, France Series data maintained by Gérard Charreaux ().
This site is part of RePEc
and all the data displayed here is part of the RePEc data set.
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to
contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .