Structure de propriété et sous-performance des firmes: une étude empirique sur le marché au comptant, le règlement mensuel et le second marché

Rajaa Mtanios and Mathieu Paquerot ()
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Mathieu Paquerot: Université de Bourgogne

Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 1999, vol. 2, issue 4, pages 157-179

Abstract: This research is focused on the study of the influence of ownership structure on the underperformance of firms in the Paris Stock Exchange. Agency theory assumes that ownership structure of a firm influences its performance and this through two of its components:the capital concentration and the nature of the stakeholders. The results are significant for the variables of the study between the different parts of the capital market but do not allow us to confirm the agency theory hypothesis

Keywords: agency theory; ownership structure; performance; corporate governance. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:2:y:1999:i:q4:p:157-179

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