La politique de stock-options des entreprises familiales cotées:quelques résultats empiriques

Gérard Hirigoyen and Thierry Poulain-Rehm
Additional contact information
Thierry Poulain-Rehm: Université de Bordeaux 4

Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2000, vol. 3, issue 1, pages 139-167

Abstract: This study investigates whether quoted family firms present particularities in stock options policy, in France. This research, which suggests a definition of family firms, is based on the analysis of the Bulletin des Annonces Légales Obligatoires and on a survey of 61 firms (24 family-controlled and 37 non-family-controlled firms). The results are am-biguous:while many family firms grant employee stock options, their policies are generally selective. Moreover, even if family-controlled firms look for participative management with stock options, the effects in terms of incentive implications and development of loyalty are contradictory. The results show that family and non-family-controlled firms have the same conduct as regard to stock options.

Keywords: stock options; family firms; participation; incentives; development of loyalty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.u-bourgogne.fr/LEG/rev/031167.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:3:y:2000:i:q1:p:139-167

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Economica, 49,rue Héricart, 75015 Paris, France

Access Statistics for this article

Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie is edited by Albert David

More articles in Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie from Editions Economica
Address: 49,rue Héricart,75015 Paris, France
Series data maintained by Gérard Charreaux ().