Légitimité et enracinement du dirigeant par le réseau des administrateurs

Jean-Pierre Pichard-Stamford ()
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Jean-Pierre Pichard-Stamford: Université Montesquieu Bordeaux 4

Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2000, vol. 3, issue 4, pages 143-178

Abstract: The subject evokes the CEO motivations to develop Board interlocks. Through Boards networks, the CEO is able to grasp information serving the stabilization of the organizational field of the firm and to defend controversial decisions more easily. The paper also describes the CEO's entrenchment within these networks regarding the performance of the firm : any significant influence on performance is detected. The average sample comprises 189 French firms quoted on the Paris stock market between 1988 and 1993.

Keywords: directors; CEO; entrenchment; legitimacy; board interlocks; performance. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:3:y:2000:i:q4:p:143-178

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