Les rentes et leurs conséquences en matière de gouvernance des entreprises

Mark J. Roe

Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2002, vol. 5, issue 1, pages 167-215

Abstract: Product markets are weaker in some nations than they are in others. Weaker product markets, and the concomitant monopoly rents, can affect corporate governance. They can do so directly by loosening a constraint on managers, thereby increasing managerial agency costs to shareholders. The monopoly profits can also affect corporate governance structures indirectly by setting up a fertile field for conflict inside the firm as the corporate players seek to grab those monopoly profits for themselves. One would expect corporate governance structures, laws, and practices to differ in nations with monopoly-induced high agency costs from those prevailing in nations with more competition, fewer monopolies, and lower agency costs. And we might speculate that these rents when large and widespread could affect democratic politics and law-making.

Keywords: agency costs; corporate governance; monopoly rents; politics; law-making. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002

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