L'actionnariat salarié dans les entreprises familiales du SBF250:un outil de création de valeur ?

Stéphane Trébucq ()
Additional contact information
Stéphane Trébucq: Université Montesquieu Bordeaux 4

Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2002, vol. 5, issue 4, pages 107-135

Abstract: The present study investigates the impact on wealth creation for shareholders when businesses are both family-owned and have ESOPs. Using data for 109 large quoted French firms from the SBF250 index, the study tends to confirm that family-controlled firms create more shareholder value but open their capital to non-management employees less often than non-family businesses do. The supposed positive impact of non-managing employee ownership on wealth creation is not confirmed. It is interesting to observe that the principle shareholder possesses a weaker block of power when there is a non-management employee ownership. This fact tends to show the instrumentation of non-management employee shareholders in order to entrench the family ownership and control.

Keywords: ESOP (employee share ownership plan); family control; wealth creation; entrenchment. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.u-bourgogne.fr/LEG/rev/054135.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:5:y:2002:i:q4:p:107-135

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Economica, 49,rue Héricart, 75015 Paris, France

Access Statistics for this article

Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie is edited by Albert David

More articles in Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie from Editions Economica
Address: 49,rue Héricart,75015 Paris, France
Series data maintained by Gérard Charreaux ().