Risque juridique et rôle des banques dans le gouvernement des entreprises

Laurent Vilanova ()
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Laurent Vilanova: Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2002, vol. 5, issue 4, pages 137-175

Abstract: During the last decade, there was a growing body of case law of lender liability in the United States and France. This doctrine, whose prime goal is to protect investors against opportunism by banks, limits the involvement of banks in the management of commercial firms. This article explores the consequences of this doctrine of lender liability. We ask three questions: what is the "dark side" of relationship banking? Why do we see such variation across countries concerning lender liability? Is the lender liability doctrine efficient?

Keywords: banks; lender liability; financial distress. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G33 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:5:y:2002:i:q4:p:137-175

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