Faut-il adopter un système pro-créanciers de défaillances? Une revue de la littérature

Gilles Recasens ()
Additional contact information
Gilles Recasens: Université Bordeaux 1

Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2003, vol. 6, issue 1, pages 119-153

Abstract: Bankruptcy choices condition, i) the efficiency of liquidation or reorganization decisions, ii) the incen-tives delivered to the debtor-in-place and its creditors. On the one hand, there is no incompatibility between a pro-creditors system and the possibility to reach informal agreements and a high proportion of firms emerging from bankruptcy as going concerns. On the other hand, credit rationing is less severe in such systems. Finally, offering a higher protection for creditors interests, pro-creditors systems let them the possibility to be more lenient. This effect favors the formal reorganization of distressed firms.

Keywords: financial distress; bankruptcy law; incentives; filtering failures; bankruptcy costs. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G33 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.u-bourgogne.fr/LEG/rev/061153.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:6:y:2003:i:q1:p:119-153

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Economica, 49,rue Héricart, 75015 Paris, France

Access Statistics for this article

Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie is edited by Albert David

More articles in Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie from Editions Economica
Address: 49,rue Héricart,75015 Paris, France
Series data maintained by Gérard Charreaux ().