Les bénéfices privés:une rupture de l'égalité entre actionnaires

Julien Le Maux ()
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Julien Le Maux: Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne

Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2003, vol. 6, issue 1, pages 63-92

Abstract: The notion of equality of shareholders, under the French civil code, jeopardized by the action of numerous minority shareholders in the courts or reported in the media. They seek, by these means, to prove that they have suffered loss through the extraction of "private benefits" by "control coalition". The purpose of this article is to propose a review of the academic works on this concept, which is attracting an increasing interest. After a definition of the principal concept and additional notions allowing a better understanding of the former, we will review the main articles on the matter.

Keywords: private benefits; controlling shareholder; asymmetric information. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:6:y:2003:i:q1:p:63-92

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