Abstract:
(VF)Cet article expose les principaux résultats d'une étude consacrée à l'influence des stock-options sur la résolution des conflits d'agence actionnaires/dirigeants en France. Si l'attribution de stock-options semble influencer les décisions d'investissement, essentiellement dans leur volet corporel, l'impact présumé sur les décisions de financement et de distribution de dividendes n'est pas décelable, pas plus que sur la création de valeur actionnariale.(VA)This paper investigates the hypothesis that executive stock options have a role in reducing agency problems. The findings are partially inconsistent with the agency hypothesis. They show that firm's investment policy seems influenced positively by stock options. However, this incentive compensation seems to have no positive influence on financing and dividend decisions and there is no relationship between option holdings and value creation.
Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie is edited by Albert David
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