Kautilya on Time Inconsistency Problem and Asymmetric Information

Balbir Sihag
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Balbir Sihag: University of Massachusetts Lowell, Lowell, Mass, USA

Indian Economic Review, 2007, vol. 42, issue 1, pages 41-55

Abstract: Although Kautilya does not provide any formal analysis, his approach contains almost all the ingredients of a game theory. He was certainly not aware of the numerous new jargons, such as sequential rationality, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, subgame perfection, backward induction, and forward induction, which have been added to the vocabulary during the past few decades to study strategic interactions. However, he clearly lays out an extensive form of a game and lists all the possible options available to a king on each node. He incorporates foresight, asymmetric information, and the possibility of ‘time inconsistency’ into his analysis of strategic interactions.

Keywords: Time Inconsistency; Credibility; Asymmetric Information; Backward Induction; Game Theoretic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007

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