On the strategic choice of spatial price policy: the role of the pricing game rules

Iñaki Aguirre () and Ana M. Martin ()
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Ana M. Martin: Universidad del Pais Vasco
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Martín Arroyuelos Ana María

Economics Bulletin, 2001, vol. 12, pages 1-7

Abstract: The strategic choice of spatial price policy under duopoly crucially depends on the rules of price competition. We show that under simultaneous price competition and under leader-follower price competition (with the discriminatory firm being the leader), the pricing policy game is not, as stated by Thisse and Vives (1988), a Prisoner's Dilemma.

Keywords: mill pricing; spatial competition; spatial price discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 D4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-07-25
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Working Paper: On the strategic choice of spatial price policy: the role of the pricing game rules (2001)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-01l10002

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