Export Taxes under Bertrand Duopoly
David Collie and
Roger Clarke ()
Additional contact information
Roger Clarke: Cardiff University
Economics Bulletin, 2006, vol. 6, issue 6, 1-8
This article analyses export taxes in a Bertrand duopoly with product differentiation, where a home and a foreign firm both export to a third-country market. It is shown that the maximum-revenue export tax always exceeds the optimum-welfare export tax. In a Nash equilibrium in export taxes, the country with the low cost firm imposes the largest export tax. The results under Bertrand duopoly are compared with those under Cournot duopoly. It is shown that the absolute value of the export subsidy or tax under Cournot duopoly exceeds the export tax under Bertrand duopoly.
JEL-codes: F1 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (7) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Export Taxes under Bertrand Duopoly (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-06f10011
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Series data maintained by John P. Conley ().