Consumer confusion and multiple equilibria
Stéphan Marette ()
Economics Bulletin, 2010, vol. 30, issue 2, pages 1120-1128
This paper focuses on consumer confusion when firms may choose between credible and non-credible certification systems for signalling quality. It is shown that the presence of confused consumers leads to the emergence of multiple stable equilibria, in which either all firms select the credible certification or all firms select the non-credible certification. A situation with numerous confused consumers is characterized by the complete absence of credible certification.
Keywords: Quality; certification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00513
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