Collusion and the elasticity of demand

Economics Bulletin, 2004, vol. 12, issue 3, pages 1-6

Abstract: The analysis of collusion in infinitely repeated Cournot oligopoly games has generally assumed that demand is linear, but this note uses constant-elasticity demand functions to investigate how the elasticity of demand affects the sustainability of collusion.

Keywords: cartel; constant elasticity demand; Cournot oligopoly; supergame (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004 Written 2004-03-19
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