Abstract:
This paper analyzes the economic and political determinants of agricultural protection in industrial countries during the period 1986-2004. Panel data regression analysis is conducted for the producer nominal assistance coefficient. The analysis reveals that the agricultural protection level is negatively associated with the agriculture¡¯s share in the total economy and the GDP per capita in agriculture. The analysis also reveals that agricultural protection levels increase when market conditions are unfavorable to agriculture, and in countries with a comparative disadvantage in agriculture. The post-UR dummy variables suggest that the Uruguay Round agreements on agriculture have not decreased international agricultural protection levels. The dummy variables for each ally in the WTO agricultural negotiations reveal that each ally has unique features and different levels of agricultural protection due to agricultural efficiency and a stance on multifunctionality of agriculture.
More articles in Economics Bulletin from Economics Bulletin Address: Economics Bulletin, Department of Economics, 414 Calhoun Hall, Vanderbilt University, Nashville TN 37235, USA Series data maintained by John Conley ().
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