Bankruptcy risk and the performance of tradable permit markets
John Stranlund () and
Wei Zhang ()
Additional contact information John Stranlund: University of Massachusetts-Amherst
Wei Zhang: University of Massachusetts-Amherst
Abstract:
We study the impacts of bankruptcy risk on markets for tradable environmental and natural resource permits. We show that bankruptcy risk in a competitive market for tradable permits causes an inefficient distribution of these permits among firms. Moreover, the equilibrium distribution of permits is dependent of the initial distribution of permits. Thus, the main reasons for implementing markets for environmental and natural resource rights do not hold when some firms are financially insecure.
More articles in Economics Bulletin from Economics Bulletin Address: Economics Bulletin, Department of Economics, 414 Calhoun Hall, Vanderbilt University, Nashville TN 37235, USA Series data maintained by John Conley ().
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