Costly participation in voting and equilibrium abstention: a uniqueness result

Economics Bulletin, 2004, vol. 4, issue 2, pages 1-5

Abstract: This note shows that a unique mixed Nash equilibrium obtains when there are three voters in Palfrey and Rosenthal's (1983) costly voting game under complete information. Experimental investigation of this result might be interesting.

Keywords: Abstention; Costly Participation; Mixed Strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004 Written 2004-01-17
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