Abstract:
In this paper, we conduct a theoretical analysis of inspections in a stochastic environment and we shed light on two hitherto unstudied issues concerning inspections in the context of invasive species management. First, given a particular port of entry in a country, we study the properties of a random inspection scheme. Second, we compute the average total fines that will be collected in the long run by an inspection agency that uses the above inspection scheme to screen arriving ships for the presence of one or more invasive species.
More articles in Economics Bulletin from Economics Bulletin Address: Economics Bulletin, Department of Economics, 414 Calhoun Hall, Vanderbilt University, Nashville TN 37235, USA Series data maintained by John Conley ().
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