A Simple Exposition of Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games

Wojciech Olszewski

Economics Bulletin, 2007, vol. 3, issue 58, pages 1-16

Abstract: Recently, there has been made a substantial progress in the analysis of repeated games with private monitoring. This progress began with introducing a new class of sequential equilibrium strategies, called belief-free equilibria, that can be analyzed using recursive techniques. The purpose of this paper is to explain the general method of constructing belief-free equilibria, and the limit (or bound) on the set of payoff vectors that can be achieved in these strategies in a way that should be easily accessible, even for those who do not pretend to be experts in repeated games.

JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-11-12
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