Evaluating coasean bargaining experiments with meta-analysis

Tyler Prante (), Jennifer A. Thacher () and Robert P. Berrens
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Tyler Prante: PhD. Candidate, Dept. of Economics, University of New Mexico
Jennifer A. Thacher: Assistant Professor, Dept. of Economics, University of New Mexico

Economics Bulletin, 2007, vol. 3, issue 68, pages 1-7

Abstract: While the Coase Theorem has been a touchstone for understanding bargaining behavior, it has also been criticized for relying on unrealistic assumptions. In response, a line of experimental research analyzes bargaining behavior in laboratory settings. This paper uses meta-analysis to evaluate the Coasean bargaining literature by modeling the probability of an efficient bargain as a function of: (1) measures of transaction costs and related variables, and (2) measures of the social dimensions of a bargain. Results suggest that efficient solutions are more likely when explicit transaction costs do not exist, in the absence of a binding time limit, and when participants have perfect information on payoff schedules. Social dimension variables are found to have the potential to affect bargaining outcomes and are an important avenue for further research.

Keywords: Coase Theorem; Coasean Experiment; Meta-Analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 H0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-12-18

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