Efficiency and converse reduction-consistency in collective choice

Yan-An Hwang () and Chun-Hsien Yeh
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Yan-An Hwang: Department of Applied Mathematics, National Dong Hwa University

Economics Bulletin, 2007, vol. 4, issue 28, pages 1-7

Abstract: We consider the problem of selecting a subset of a feasible set over which each agent has a strict preference. We propose an invariance property, converse reduction-consistency, which is the converse of reduction-consistency introduced by Yeh (2006), and study its implications. Our results are two characterizations of the Pareto rule: (1) it is the only rule satisfying efficiency and converse reduction-consistency and (2) it is the only rule satisfying one-agent efficiency, converse reduction-consistency, and reduction-consistency.

Keywords: consistency; converse consistency; efficiency; Pareto rule; social choice correspondences. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-08-10

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