Double Bertrand competition among intermediaries when consumers can default

Frederique Bracoud ()

Economics Bulletin, 2007, vol. 4, issue 7, pages 1-16

Abstract: This paper models a sequential double price competition among intermediaries when their expected revenue per sale is affected by consumers' default. If this revenue is non-monotonic with the asking price, the Walrasian outcome may not be an equilibrium and demand rationing may emerge instead.

Keywords: Bertrand Competition; Consumer Default; Demand Rationing.; Double-sided Competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-02-21
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2007/volume4/EB-05D40005A.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2007:i:7:p:1-16

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from Economics Bulletin
Address: Economics Bulletin, Department of Economics, 414 Calhoun Hall, Vanderbilt University, Nashville TN 37235, USA
Series data maintained by John Conley ().