Representing Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space: A Corrigendum -super-1

Eddie Dekel (), Barton Lipman (), Aldo Rustichini and Todd Sarver

Econometrica, 2007, vol. 75, issue 2, pages 591-600

Abstract: Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) (henceforth DLR) axiomatically characterized three representations of preferences that allow for a desire for flexibility and/or commitment. In one of these representations (ordinal expected utility), the independence axiom is stated in a weaker form than is necessary to obtain the representation; in another (additive expected utility), the continuity axiom is too weak. In this erratum we provide examples showing that the axioms used by DLR are not sufficient, and provide stronger versions of these axioms that, together with the other axioms used by DLR, are necessary and sufficient for these two representations. Copyright The Econometric Society 2007.

Date: 2007

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