Risk Aversion in the Nash Bargaining Problem with Risky Outcomes and Risky Disagreement Points

Zvi Safra, Lin Zhou and Itzhak Zilcha

Econometrica, 1990, vol. 58, issue 4, pages 961-65

Date: 1990
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