Private Observation, Communication and Collusion

Michihiro Kandori and Hitoshi Matsushima

Econometrica, 1998, vol. 66, issue 3, pages 627-652

Abstract: The authors examine discounted repeated games where players privately observe different signals. A leading example is secret price cutting; a firm cannot directly observe rival firms' price cutting but its own sales can imperfectly indicate what is going on. The characterization of equilibria in this class of games has been an open question. The authors construct equilibria where players voluntarily communicate what they have observed and prove folk theorems. Their results thus provide a theoretical support for the conventional wisdom that communication facilitates collusion.

Date: 1998
View citations in EconPapers

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:66:y:1998:i:3:p:627-652

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... mb.asp?ref=0012-9682

Access Statistics for this article

Econometrica is edited by Stephen Morris

More articles in Econometrica from Econometric Society
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().