The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring

Johannes Hörner and Wojciech Olszewski

Econometrica, 2006, vol. 74, issue 6, pages 1499-1544

Abstract: We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost-perfect monitoring. Our result covers all finite, n-player games that satisfy the usual full-dimensionality condition. Mixed strategies are allowed in determining the individually rational payoffs. We assume no cheap-talk communication between players and no public randomization device. Copyright The Econometric Society 2006.

Date: 2006
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