Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value

Geoffroy de Clippel () and Roberto Serrano ()

Econometrica, 2008, vol. 76, issue 6, pages 1413-1436

Abstract: Our concern is the extension of the theory of the Shapley value to problems involving externalities. Using the standard axiom systems behind the Shapley value leads to the identification of bounds on players' payoffs around an "externality-free" value. The approach determines the direction and maximum size of Pigouvian-like transfers among players, transfers based on the specific nature of externalities that are compatible with basic normative principles. Examples are provided to illustrate the approach and to draw comparisons with previous literature. Copyright 2008 The Econometric Society.

Date: 2008

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.3982/ECTA7224 link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: MARGINAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXTERNALITIES IN THE VALUE (2005)
Working Paper: Marginal contributions and externalities in the value (2007)
Working Paper: Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:76:y:2008:i:6:p:1413-1436

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... mb.asp?ref=0012-9682

Access Statistics for this article

Econometrica is edited by Stephen Morris

More articles in Econometrica from Econometric Society
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().