Characterization of Revenue Equivalence

Birgit Heydenreich, Rudolf Müller, Marc Uetz and Rakesh V. Vohra

Econometrica, 2009, vol. 77, issue 1, pages 307-316

Abstract: The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. We give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly infinite) outcome space and many of the known results are immediate consequences. Moreover, revenue equivalence can be identified in cases where existing theorems are silent. Copyright 2009 The Econometric Society.

Date: 2009

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.3982/ECTA7168 link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Characterization of Revenue Equivalence (2007)
Working Paper: Characterization of Revenue Equivalence (2007)
Working Paper: Characterization of Revenue Equivalence (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:77:y:2009:i:1:p:307-316

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... mb.asp?ref=0012-9682

Access Statistics for this article

Econometrica is edited by Stephen Morris

More articles in Econometrica from Econometric Society
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().