Terrorism and electoral accountability: One strike, you're out!

Martin Gassebner (), Richard Jong-A-Pin () and Jochen Mierau ()

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 100, issue 1, pages 126-129

Abstract: We examine the relationship between terrorism and electoral accountability. We find that terror has a robust positive effect on the probability that the incumbent government is replaced. The magnitude of the effect increases with the severity of the terrorist attack.

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