Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences

Ahmed Doghmi and Abderrahmane Ziad

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 100, issue 1, pages 157-160

Abstract: In exchange economies with single-peaked preferences, we find that: (1) several solutions satisfy Theorem 1 of Doghmi and Ziad [Doghmi, A., Ziad, A., 2008-this issue. Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability. Economics Letters.], (2) strict monotonicity is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity. We examine also the implementation of the weak core in coalitional games.

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