Disagreement leads to complete learning: Sequential choice with continuous types

Thomas Wiseman

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 100, issue 1, pages 53-55

Abstract: Players with observable, continuous payoff types choose actions sequentially. Players update beliefs about the payoff-relevant state of nature using private signals and information about previous signals in the history of types and actions. Heterogeneity in preferences ensures complete learning.

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