Fair divisions as attracting Nash equilibria of simple games

Marco Galbiati ()

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 100, issue 1, pages 72-75

Abstract: We give a mechanism fully implementing envy-free divisions such that: strategy spaces are symmetric, the set of Nash equilibria is a global attractor for the best-reply dynamics. As a byproduct, undesired mixed-strategy equilibria are weeded out by the adjustment process.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V84 ... 27e10254ffab3f90fbdc
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Fair Divisions as Attracting Nash Equilibria of Simple Games (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is edited by E. Maskin

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Series data maintained by Heidi Boesdal ().